Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?
Preferences for charitable giving in auctions can be modeled by assuming that bidders receive additional utility proportional to the revenue raised by an auctioneer. The theory of bidding in the presence of such preferences results in a very counterintuitive prediction which is that, in many cases,...
|Published in:||Experimental Economics : A Journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2010), p. 14-44|
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|Item Description:||The authors would like to thank participants of the Rome ESA International meeting, Econometric Society Summer 2008 meeting and Michael H. Rothkopf Memorial Conference for helpful comments. This study was funded in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation, grant #0451970. The online version of this article (10.1007/s10683-009-9227-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.|
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Experimental Economics : A Journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2010), p. 14-44